How to secure database traffic the other way around, that is to say, from client to server_问答_开发者

My scenary:

I am trying to develop a service which will query different databases.

To clear the above statement up:

I use the word service in its broadest sense: a sofware component that will provide some value to the database owner.
These databases will be in no way under my control as they will belong to different companies. They won't be known beforehand and multiple vendors are to be supported: Oracle, MS (SQL Server), MySql, PostgreSQL. Also, OLE DB and ODBC connections will be supported.

The problem: security of database credentials and overall traffic is a big concern but the configuration effort should be reduced at a minimum. Ideally, all the security issues should be addressed programmatically in the service implementation and require no configuration effort for the database owner other than provide a valid connection string.

Usually, database SSL support is done through server certificates which I want to avoid as it is cumbersome for the client (the database owner). I have been looking into how to do this to no avail. Hopefully this might be done with openssl, SSPI, client SSL certificate or any form of tunneling; or may be it is just not posible. Some advice would be greatly apreciatted. 开发者_JAVA技巧

I am having a bit of difficulty understanding how this service would work without being extremely cumbersome for the database owner even before you try to secure the traffic with the database.

Take Oracle in particular (though I assume there would be similar issues with other databases). In order for your service to access an Oracle database, the owner of the database would have to open up a hole in their firewall to allow your server(s) to access the database on a particular port so they would need to know the IP addresses of your servers and there is a good chance that they would need to configure a service that does all of its communication on a single port (by default, the Oracle listener will frequently redirect the client to a different port for the actual interaction with the database). If they are at all security conscious, they would have to install Oracle Connection Manager on a separate machine to proxy the connection between your server and the database rather than exposing the database directly to the internet. That's quite a bit of configuration work that would be required internally and that's assuming that the database account already exists with appropriate privileges and that everyone signs off on granting database access from outside the firewall.

If you then want to encrypt communication with the database, you'd either need to establish a VPN connection to the database owner's network (which would potentially eliminate some of the firewall issues) or you'd need to use something like Oracle Advanced Security to encrypt the communication between your servers. Creating VPN connections to many different customer networks would require a potentially huge configuration effort and could require that you maintain one server per customer because different customers will have different VPN software requirements that may be mutually incompatible. The Advanced Security option is an extra cost license on top of the enterprise edition Oracle license that the customer would have to go out and purchase (and it would not be cheap). You'd only get to the point of worrying about getting an appropriate SSL certificate once all these other hoops had been jumped through. The SSL certificate exchange would seem like the easiest part of the whole process.

And that's just to support Oracle. Support for other databases will involve a similar series of steps but the exact process will tend to be slightly different.

I would tend to expect that you'd be better served, depending on the business problem you're trying to solve, by creating a product that your customers could install on their own servers inside their network that would connect to a database and would have an interface that would either send data to your central server via something like HTTPS POST calls or that would listen for HTTPS requests that could be sent to database and the results returned over HTTP.

SSL is very important in order to keep a client's database safe. But there is more than just that. You have to make sure that each database account is locked down. Each client must only have access to their own database. Further more, every database has other privileges which are nasty. For instance MySQL has FILE_PRIV which allows an account to read/write files. MS-SQL has xp_cmdshell which allows the user to access cmd.exe from sql (why would they do this!?). PostgreSQL allows you to write stored procedures in any language and from there you can call all sorts of nasty functions.

Then, there are other problems. A Malformed query can cause a buffer overflows which will give an attacker the keys to the kingdom. You have to make sure all of your databases are up to date, and then pray no one drops an 0-day.