In case of webapplicaiton I can understand that there is no difference between the client authentication and user authenticaiton; Ignoring XSS and other exploits the web client is generated by the server/servlet.
But suppose you have a Java client application talking to the Java Server application; The server has a certificate associated with it so that the client can validate and verify if server is trusted. Now client also has a certificate (client cert) so that the server can verify if this is a trusted client; Once this mutual authentication is done, instead of presenting a username/password dialog to the user, the users certificate (user cert) can be passed to the server.
Question is whether there is any advantage/use in this case in having a (client cert); Or will the user certificate alone will suffice to trust the client as well ??
I know this is an obvious question/ but cant a rouge client applicatio开发者_如何学Cn be created ?? So will the client cert protect against this scenario.
Any time you have a client server application the server needs to assume the client is compromised. When an authentication occurs (username/password, certificate, etc... it doesn't matter) the server should grant the user certain permissions to use the functionality of the server. Whenever a request is made to the server the server needs to check whether the authenticated user has the permission to perform that action.
Trusting the client to only make authorized requests opens yourself up to attacks. If you check permissions on the server and scrub inputs then you don't have to worry about whether the user is using a trusted client because even an untrusted client won't be able to do more than the trusted client could with the same authentication credentials.
These principles apply regardless of wether you are using a web client or a stand alone client. Even in a web app I can write a new client and POST data, use RESTful services, or generally talk to the web server and completely bypass the web ui you present to me.
If some attacker gets to alter in some way the client application, it could use the valid user certification to access the server.
The server should verify the client app, not for server sake (we assume the server checks if client can do this or that operation, but for ensuring the client is not being phished by a bogus client). Then the server can proclaim that all operations made by client-1 we're made through some verified client-app (agent) so they were really intended by the user.
The client application's certificate (and it's private key) can be easily ripped off the application and rogue application can be created. The ways to counteract this are (a) use user's certificate and let the user provide it when needed and (b) use a USB cryptotoken to store the client certificate and it's private key. Cryptotokens don't let the private keys out so the attacker can't copy it (though he can use the token with his application, if he has physical access to the token).
精彩评论