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Privacy and Anonymization "Algorithm"

开发者 https://www.devze.com 2023-03-11 18:32 出处:网络
I read this problem in a book (Interview Question), and wanted to discuss this problem, in detail over here. Kindly throw some lights on it.

I read this problem in a book (Interview Question), and wanted to discuss this problem, in detail over here. Kindly throw some lights on it.

The problem is as follows:-

Privacy & Anonymization

The Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission had a bright idea back in the mid 1990s - it decided to release "anonymized" data on state employees that showed every single hospital visit they had.

The goal was to help the researchers. The state spent time removing identifiers such as name, address and social security no. The Governor of Masachusetts assured the public that this was sufficient to protect patient privacy.

Then a graduate student, saw significant pitfalls in this approach. She requested a copy of the data and by collating the data in multiple columns, she was able to identify the health records of the Governor.

This demonstrated that extreme care needs to be taken in anonymizing data. One way of ensuring privacy is to aggregate data such that any开发者_如何学JAVA record can be mapped to at least k individuals, for some large value of k.

I wanted to actually experience this problem, with some kind of example set, and then what it actually takes to do this anonymization. I hope you are clear with the question.....

I have no experienced person, who can help me deal with such kind of problems. Kindly don't put votes to close this question..... As I would be helpless, if this happens...

Thanks & if any more explanation in question required, kindly shoot with the questions.


I just copy pasted part of your text, and stumbled upon this

This helps understanding your problem :

At the time GIC released the data, William Weld, then Governor of Massachusetts, assured the public that GIC had protected patient privacy by deleting identifiers. In response, then-graduate student Sweeney started hunting for the Governor’s hospital records in the GIC data. She knew that Governor Weld resided in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a city of 54,000 residents and seven ZIP codes. For twenty dollars, she purchased the complete voter rolls from the city of Cambridge, a database containing, among other things, the name, address, ZIP code, birth date, and sex of every voter. By combining this data with the GIC records, Sweeney found Governor Weld with ease. Only six people in Cambridge shared his birth date, only three of them men, and of them, only he lived in his ZIP code. In a theatrical flourish, Dr. Sweeney sent the Governor’s health records (which included diagnoses and prescriptions) to his office.

Boom! But it was only an early mile marker in Sweeney's career; in 2000, she showed that 87 percent of all Americans could be uniquely identified using only three bits of information: ZIP code, birthdate, and sex.

Well, as you stated it, you need a random database, and ensure that any record can be mapped to at least k individuals, for some large value of k.

In other words, you need to clear the database of discriminative information. For example, if you keep in the database only the sex (M/F), then there is no way to found out who is who. Because there are only two entries : M and F.

But, if you take the birthdate, then your total number of entries become more or less 2*365*80 ~=50.000. (I chose 80 years). Even if your database contain 500.000 people, there is a chance that one of them (let's say a male born on 03/03/1985) is the ONLY one with such entry, thus you can recognize him.

This is only a simplistic approach that relies on combinatorial stuff. If you're wanting something more complex, look for correlated information and PCA

Edit : Let's give an example. Let's suppose I'm working with medical things. If I keep only

  • The sex : 2 possibilities (M, F)
  • The blood group : 4 possibilities (O, A, B, AB)
  • The rhesus : 2 possibilities (+, -)
  • The state they're living in : 50 possibilities (if you're in the USA)
  • The month of birth : 12 possibilities (affects death rate of babies)
  • Their age category : 10 possibilities (0-9 years old, 10-19 years old ... 90-infinity)

That leads to a total number of category of 2*4*2*50*12*10 = 96.000 categories. Thus, if your database contains 200.000.000 entries (rough approximation of the number of inhabitants in the USA that are in your database) there is NO WAY you can identify someone.

This also implies that you do not give out any further information, no ZIP code, etc... With only the 6 information given, you can compute some nice statistics (do persons born in december live longer?) but there is no identification possible because 96.000 is very inferior to 200.000.000.

However, if you only have the database of the city you live in, who has for example 200.000 inhabitants, the you cannot guaranty anonymization. Because 200.000 is "not much bigger" than 96.000. ("not much bigger" is a true complex scientifical term that requires knowledge in probabilities :P )


"I wanted to actually experience this problem, with some kind of example set, and then what it actually takes to do this anonymization."

You can also construct your own dataset by finding one alone, "anonymizing" it, and trying to reconstruct it.


Here is a very detailed discussion of the de-identification/anonymization problem, and potential tools & techniques for solving them.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDQQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.infoway-inforoute.ca%2Findex.php%2Fcomponent%2Fdocman%2Fdoc_download%2F624-tools-for-de-identification-of-personal-health-information&ei=QiO0VL72J-3nsATkl4CQBg&usg=AFQjCNF3YUE2cl9QZTuw-L4PYtWnzmwlIQ&sig2=JE8bYkqg04auXstgF0f7Aw&bvm=bv.83339334,d.cWc

The jurisdiction for the document above is within the rules of the Canadian public health system, but they are conceptually applicable to other jurisdictions.

For the U.S., you would specifically need to comply with the HIPAA de-identification requirements. http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-identification/guidance.html

"Conceptually applicable" does not mean "compliant". To be compliant, with the EU, for example, you would need to dig into their specific EU requirements as well as the country requirements and potentially State/local requirements.

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